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Kant's views on space and time changed during his 
life, and reflected at various times his pre-occupation 
with Newtonianism, and Leibnizian relationalism, before 
reaching maturity in the doctrine of transcendental 
idealism. His discovery of the synthetic a priori 
nature of geometrical propositions made some radical 
transformation of these earlier views necessary, al-
though Kant had already recognised their inadequacies 
before the critical synthesis had been accomplished. 
The conflicting pulls of Newton and Leibniz—neither of 
whose theories were ever totally abandoned—and the 
concern with the false dichotomy of logic and ex-
perience, each played their part in shaping the criti-
cal theory of space and time as presuppositional forms. 
The history of Kant's thinking on space in particular 
is highlighted by the argument from incongruent coun-
terparts, which seemed to occupy Kant as a problem, 
though not always as a paradox, throughout the vicissi-
tudes of his thinking on space. More important, the 
argument is, at the very least, a supplementary proof 
of the a priori and intuitive nature of space. 1 
The argument first appears in the article 
"Concerning the Ultimate Ground for the Differentiation 
of Regions in Space", which appeared in 1768.* In this 
paper, Kant seems to be moved to write under the 
stimulus of the Newton-Leibniz debate. He argues 
against those 'German philosophers' who deny reality to 
space, and at this stage supports Newton. There is 
though, much more to it than this. Even though the 
original article was a defense of an absolutist posi-
tion, it nonetheless contains most of the important in-
sights and considerations which were to lead eventually 
to a rejection of its most explicit conclusion, viz., 
the existence of Newtonian space, and which developed 
into the critical view of space as a priori intuition 
and as transcendentally ideal. Kant is concerned with 
the grounds for differentiating 'regions' in space. 
For Newton, space was a 'substantial' entity; for 
Leibniz, spatial qualities were reducible to the 
properties of phenomenal aggregates which are not in 
themselves ultimately real. The stimulus of this de-
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bate leads Kant to suggest a justification for an anti-
Leibnizian position, and an indirect confirmation of 
the Newtonian alternative. The argument is not an ex-
plicit attempt to prove that space is absolute and not 
relational, but is more plausibly regarded as one that 
favours the view that space is.some kind of reality, 
rather than a merely ideal system of relations. For 
Kant, the notion of 'differentiable regions' implies 
that space is real. 1 Kant will argue that a full ex-
planation of incongruent counterparts entails reference 
both to the objects, and their relations in space, 
regarded as distinct from those objects. That the 
parts of space are only possible through limitations of 
a prior totality of space, is an assertion that Kant 
makes in all his writings, both pre-critical and 
critical; it is a view that is certainly found in 
Newton. The positions of the parts of space presuppose 
a region, according to which they are ordered; that is, 
there is some ordering relation through which all poss-
ible positions in space are connected. At this stage 
it seems clear that the whole of which these parts are 
parts, is absolute space, although Kant does not simply 
assume this to be the case. A region, he says, does 
not consist in the relations that one thing in space 
has to the next—this would be position, or 'relation 
of the situation'. For Leibniz, the region must con-
sist phenomenally in relations obtaining between 
substances—by means of confused perception—and cannot 
refer to any external space in which the relations are 
possible. Kant asserts that a region is the relation 
of a system of positions to absolute space. Now the 
position of the parts of an object with respect to each 
other are sufficiently recognised from the object 
itself. The region to which this order of the parts is 
directed, is related to absolute space: the region, in 
this sense, corresponds to Newton's 'relative' space, 
and because of the definition of spatial totality in 
terms of limitations of relative spaces, this region 
'belongs' to absolute space. It is Kant's intention to 
offer grounds for the assertion of the independent 
reality of this system of all possible regions, i.e., 
absolute space. Such a demonstration would be impossi-
ble, Kant says, if appeal is made merely to abstract 
metaphysical principles; this challenges Leibniz's at-
tempt to base his refutation of Newtonian space on the 
principle of sufficient reason etc. 
Since space has three dimensions, three surfaces 
can be conceived in physical space. We have, says 
Kant, knowledge of external things only by means of 
relations of sensuous impressions to ourselves: from 
the relation of these intersecting surfaces to our body 
we derive the ultimate foundation for constructing the 
concept of spatial regions. This is a clue to under-
standing Kant's later view of space as intersubjective, 
and will be taken up again below. 
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Kant is trying to show that the complete principle 
of determining physical form does not, and cannot rest 
merely on the relation and situation of the parts of 
objects with respect to each other, but must also rest 
on their relation to external space. This formulation 
of the position suggests very strongly that Kant never 
intended to demonstrate that the difference between in-
congruent counterparts depends purely on the relation 
to space, but requires in addition reference to the 
shape of the object—that is, internal characteristics. 
This relation to absolute space cannot be immediately 
'perceived', but the physical differences that rest 
uniguely and alone on this ground can be perceived. 
Such differences are of course the left- and right-
handedness of certain objects. 
Consider a left and right hand: in terms of 
geometrical properties, proportions, situation of parts 
relative to other parts, etc., a complete description 
of one serves as a complete description of the other. 
"So much may be sufficient to understand the possibil-
ity of completely like and similar and yet incongruent 
spaces.1"1 Now Kant can only mean by 'spaces' here, the 
region that a body occupies, or the containing surface 
of the body. This is important, since Kant's most in-
teresting solution to this problem will concern the 
relationship holding between a body and the external 
space in which the body exists. Kant's next point is 
confusing. He says that the determinations of space 
are not consequences of the situations of the parts of 
matter relative to each other; rather, the situations 
of the parts are consequences of the determinations of 
space. Yet the parts of an object are supposedly 
describable without reference to external space; I take 
this to accord with the Leibnizian claim that these 
relations are not properly describable as spatial at 
all. Here however Kant is saying that the situations 
of the parts are somehow to be considered as conse-
quences of the determinations of space. Yet regions, 
on Kant's view, can be differentiated only through the 
connections that objects have to absolute space. It is 
difficult to see what is involved in the assertion that 
space as such could have determinations which were not 
simply relations to already existing objects, unless 
one presupposes a Newtonian spatial structure of diff-
erentiated points, which 'exist' prior to and indepen-
dently of physical objects." 
After consideration of the geometrical properties 
of the two objects, it is clear that some difference 
remains unexplained; this difference, Kant insists, 
must be internal. The surface which encloses one can-
not enclose the other. The fact that this 'limiting 
space' can be applied in one case and not the other 
suggests that the difference rests on some 'inner 
principle'I However, it cannot have anything to do 
with how the parts of the object are connected: first-
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ly, because different regions cannot be explained in 
this way; and secondly, because so far as the arrange-
ment of the parts is concerned, the objects are 
identical. Kant says that in the constitution of 
bodies real differences are found which are connected 
with absolute and 'original' space, since it is only 
through this space that the relation obtaining between 
physical things is possible. 
At the end of the 1768 article Kant makes some 
remarks about space which anticipate the position he 
was eventually to take in his mature philosophy; they 
also relate to some otherwise puzzling remarks in the 
1768 article, and to the use he subsequently made of 
the argument in later writings. Absolute space, he 
concludes, is not an object of external sensation: it 
is a fundamental concept which makes these sensations 
themselves possible. This suggests Kant's mature posi-
tion that takes space as a necessary representation un-
derlying all outer impressions of the senses, i.e. an a 
priori intuition. Kant considered that all knowledge 
of external things by means of relations of sense im-
pressions must ultimately be related to a perceiving 
subject. I take this to mean that without having seen 
the full implications of the view at this stage, Kant 
has seen the impossibility of regarding space as a 
purely intellectual entity, which might be described 
without reference either to objects, which differenti-
ate it, or to perceiving subjects, which essentially 
constitute it. It is only by means of the relations of 
bodies that we can 'perceive' the relations to 'pure' 
space.' 
There is a short reference to incongruent counter-
parts in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. Here, the 
use of the argument occurs within the wider context of 
arguments designed to show that space and time are not 
rational entities, nor objective ideas, but are in fact 
'phenomena'. Whereas in the earlier article it seemed 
sometimes that Kant was wavering between Leibnizian 
rationalism and Newton!anism seen in relation to a 
whole system of physics, the Dissertation argument 
firmly rejects both of these in favour of a recognisa-
bly subjectivist approach, which would develop into 
transcendental idealism. All the important new prin-
ciples of the critical position are embryonically pre-
sent in the Inaugural Dissertation. The concept of 
space is a singular representation, and is pure intui-
tion; that is, space is an a priori particular. The 
argument from incongruent counterparts supports this 
position, which I suggested is latent, and unrecognised 
in the earlier article. With opposite handed objects 
the diversity, that is, the 'discongruity', can only be 
noticed by a certain 'act' in pure intuition. In the 
1768 article the solution to the problem was that the 
objects differed in their relations to external space; 
this position has now been abandoned in favour of the 
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far more subtle view which leads to transcendental 
idealism. However, the solution offered in the 
Dissertation might be considered on other grounds. 7 
What I take Kant to be saying here is this: any handed 
object, when considered apart from the conditions of 
experience, is indeterminate with respect to whether it 
is left or right. I interpret Kant here to be making a 
transcendental idealist point in the restricted sense 
in which this implies some doctrine about meaning. A 
single hand, alone in the universe, is not an object of 
a possible experience, and as such it is literally 
meaningless to say that such a hand is determinate with 
respect to whether it is left or right. These latter 
concepts presuppose an orientation in space; since 
space is a form of representation and not an objective 
independently existing entity, such orientations pre-
suppose a perceiving mind. There is a definite 
Leibnizian legacy here. 'Left', 'right', 'large', and 
'small' are treated as relational; they require some 
given framework in order to be fully intelligible. 
Kant is adding the subjectivity of space as the stan-
dard against which such concepts attain significance. 
For Leibniz the relations would be ultimately explica-
ble in terms of the attributes of monads: Kant is 
trying to show that this explanation leaves out 
someting important—hence his assertion that the diver-
sity of the hands can only be noticed in an act in pure 
intuition. Ideas like left and right are merely 
'conventional', and cannot be given a meaning--a sense 
in abstraction from perceiving minds.' 
The transcendental idealist interpretation of the 
argument is naturally supported by the use made of it 
in the Prolegomena. There Kant argues against those 
who take space to be a real quality of things in 
themselves. This complements the argument in the 
Dissertation, which takes space to be a pure intuition. 
Kant points out that various figures show, in spite of 
complete 'inner agreement', an outer relation, which 
makes it impossible to superpose one figure on the 
space of the other; yet the difference is given as be-
ing inner. This inner difference, which conceptual un-
derstanding cannot define, reveals itself through the 
outer relations to space. What I think Kant means here 
is that this difference only shows itself through the 
relation it has to an experiencing subject, for whom 
space is the condition of the possibility of any and 
every object in space. Consider opposite hands: there 
are no inner differences that can be revealed through 
merely conceptual analysis; yet the differences are in^ 
ner so far as the senses tell us. In other words, 
while~the objects are similar when considered conceptu-
ally, they are experienced as being essentially dif-
ferent. Since we can have no experience of space as an 
independent self-subsisting entity, then the difference 
must be grounded in us, through space as 
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representation. Kant's solution in the Prolegomena is 
that since objects are not representations of things as 
they are in themselves, and as a pure understanding 
would cognise them—in an 'intellectual intuition'—but 
rather, are sensible intuitions, that is, appearances, 
the possibility of which rests on the relations of cer-
tain things unknown in themselves to sensibility: then 
the difference between incongruent counterparts can 
only be made intelligible by referring them to an act, 
which takes place in pure intuition.' 
There seem to be three main lines through which to 
approach Kant's problem. First, there is the insight 
of the original 1768 article, in which the 'solution' 
involves the postulation of something like Newtonian 
space; second, there is the transcendental idealist 
solution, suggested in the Dissertation, and then 
developed in the Critique itself, (although there is no 
mention of the problem in the latter); and third, there 
is the modern approach, which can be traced to both 
Leibniz and Kant, and relies upon either abstract 
geometrical considerations, or a more general appeal to 
the topological features of objects and their relations 
to the spaces in which they are embedded. In a recent 
work, Nerlich has claimed that Kant's original ideas 
were almost entirely correct. 1 0 Nerlich generalises 
the problem by referring the argument to 
'enantiomorphic' objects—spirals, hands, etc.,--
withoug bringing in the question whether it is feasible 
to consider the determinateness of such objects. What 
is at stake is the handedness of the object, rather 
than whether it is a left or a right hand. Nerlich 
claims that when Kant introduced the handless body into 
his thought-experiment, he was aiming to show that the 
object must have been an enantiomorph, not that the 
hand must have been either left or right. Nerlich 
says, following Kant, that whether an object is an en-
antiomorph or not depends on the nature of the space it 
is in, thus confirming Kant's original insight. Thus 
the problem of incongruent counterparts depends for its 
resolution on considerations of both the shape of the 
object and the 'shape' of space. This is the point 
that I attributed to Kant above. Kant says that a com-
plete principle of determining physical form does not 
rest merely on the relation and situation of the parts 
of the object with respect to each other, but also on 
its relation to external space. Nerlich develops this 
idea, employing the ideas of 'orientable' and 'non-
orientable' spaces to demonstrate how the relationship 
between the object, and the kind of space in which it 
is 'embedded', determines whether it is enantiomorphic 
or, as he puts it, 'homomorphic'. Objects are homomor-
phic if they are indifferent with respect to leftness 
or rightness; for example, opposite-handed triangles in 
a one-sided non-orientable manifold such as a Klein 
'bottle', can be reversed by transporting them through 
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the space by means of a continuous motion. 1 1 Now 
Neulich claims that it is senseless to say that a hand 
is neither enantiomorphic nor homomorphic: this is a 
direct challenge to a transcendental idealist inter-
pretation of the argument, which in effect states that 
the question of whether the lone hand is either left or 
right is meaningless before this is taken in the con-
text of possible experience. Nerlich's point is more 
difficult. It is one thing to claim that the question 
as to which hand it is must be meaningless, but it is 
quite another to say that it is also meaningless to as-
sert that it is handed as such. This brings us to 
questions of topology, and some modern 'solutions' to 
this whole problem. 
There is one way of dealing with Kant's original 
problem which seems both elegant and compelling, and 
yet takes the argument into a thicket of epistemologi-
cal difficulties. The argument can be put like this: 
Kant was puzzled by how it is that two objects can be 
alike in essential conceptual characteristics and yet 
manifest an obvious dissimilarity. However, if we take 
the problem down one spatial dimension, the 'paradox' 
admits of a clear and intuitively satisfactory solu-
tion. Consider two opposite handed shapes in two 
dimensions, and how any two dimensional 'beings' living 
in such a universe, (e.g. 'beings' whose space was con-
fined to the surface of a sphere) would react to such 
objects. They would be, so the argument goes, as 
puzzled by these shapes as we are by enantiomorphic ob-
jects in three dimensions. Yet we can see that their 
puzzlement is simply due to the limitations of spatial 
imagination. By rotating one of the two-dimensional 
objects in our 'extra' spatial dimension, we can super-
pose one onto the space of the other. The two-
dimensional beings would have no way of visualising the 
process that had occurred, at least not as a continuous 
transformation of the object through three dimensions; 
but if--and here the analogy becomes a fairy-tale--they 
were sufficiently clever mathematicians, they might be 
able to work out the properties of a space possessing 
one more dimension than their own, and thus explain the 
existece of incongruent counterparts in two-dimensional 
space. Thus it is easy to see why we are so puzzled by 
such objects in three dimensions: the 'solution' is to 
'rotate' one of them through a space of four dimen-
sions; we could then superpose it on the space of its 
counterpart. 
This analogical solution raises almost as many pro-
blems as it was designed to solve. The first point is 
very general, and is aimed at all wild extrapolations 
from concepts amenable to mathematical manipulation—n-
dimensional spaces, for instance (when n = 3)—to ac-
tual possibilities: in other words, the move from what 
is logically possible, to what is really possible, 
where the latter concerns those things that could be 
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part of a possible experience. 1 2 There are not, and 
could not be, beings of two-dimensions who, in addition 
to having two-dimensional sense organs, are also capa-
ble of perceiving two-dimensional plane figures, and 
have two-dimensional brains that think mathematically. 
The second point is less frivolous, but is implied by 
the first; possible worlds of one, two or 3+n 
dimensions are abstractions—not real, but ideal. We 
should no more think of 'hypercubes' as real entities, 
than we should hypostatise points, lines and surfaces 
in Euclidean space. Such objects 'exist' only insofar 
as there exist mathematical operations and relations 
incorporating them. There is no reason to believe in a 
physical space of four dimensions: the argument above 
therefore remains an analogy, which theoretically 
accounts for two-dimensional incongruent counterparts, 
but which cannot be simply extended to higher 
dimensions. The problem in three dimensions concerns 
the application of abstract geometrical principles to a 
particular spatio-temporal phenomenon; the analogical 
argument concerns the application of one abstraction to 
another. The purely theoretical nature of this analog-
ical solution may in addition be taken as confirmation 
of the necessity of the three-dimensional character of 
perceptual space. We can say that the perceptual space 
of any being will have the same number of dimensions as 
opposite handed objects which cannot be superposed by 
continuous transformations of the objects. Thus our 
perceptual space has three dimensions, since there do 
not exist for us incongruent counterparts of two-
dimensions; it remains logically possible that our 
three-dimensional space is the 'surface' for some 3+n 
dimensional being; but our perceptual apparatus does 
not allow us to witness the 'rotation' of a three-
dimensional solid in any higher space as a continuous 
motion. 
There is an additional consideration that casts 
doubt on the plausibility of the two-dimensional an-
alogue. The latter suggests that handedness is deter-
mined by some putative relation to a higher dimensional 
space, but there are reasons for thinking that it 
depends, as Nerlich indicates, on the way the object is 
'entered' into its own space. Consider a left-g;iove 
shape, in two-dimensions, living on the curious surface 
of a Möbius band--a non-orientable space having only 
one side. Such an 'object' is homomorphic, since 
transporting it around the space will turn it into a 
right hand. However, unless our three 'dimensional 
space can be plausibly considered to be similarly non-
orientable, the equivalent process in three dimensions 
could not be carried through. The two ways of resolv-
ing the problem by analogies with other spaces leave 
this alternative: either enantiomorphic objects are 
really homomorphic--because our space is a non-
orientable manifold; or we just have to believe in a 
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real fourth spatial dimension. In either case the 
original 'paradox' dissolves, but the mysteries deepen 
in other areas. It has been suggested that if some of 
the laws of physics are not left-right indifferent, 
then it should be possible to say of some object that 
it is left- or right-handed even if it was, like 
'Kant's hand', alone in the universe. 1 1 Since time is 
one-dimensional, there can be no temporal 'mirror 
images', in the same way that there are no mirror 
images for lines in two-dimensional space. But there 
is a further consideration: space has no preferred 
direction; if it had, then left- and right-handedness 
could be uniquely determined—rather in the way that 
the mathematician deals with it in terms of even and 
odd permutations, except that in such a case the at-
tribution of direction would be non-arbitrary. What 
Kant has pointed out is that two opposite handed ob-
jects can be seen to be such, but not defined. The 
direction of time always gives us a unique difference 
between before and after: the lack of intrinsic direc-
tion for space presents us with the problem of mirror 
images, which may be directly intuited, but conceptual-
ly defined only by an arbitrary act of pointing that 
presupposes this intuition. 
The three attempts to resolve the problem--that is, 
by reference to external space; by appeal to the nature 
of space as representation; and through topological 
analysis, all add to an understanding of the original 
problem, operating as they do on different levels of 
philosophical abstraction. There is some support for 
Nerlich's solution, (appealing to the fact that space 
itself has a structure) from Hermann Weyl. The con-
gruent mappings of space from the group of transforma-
tions called the Euclidean group of motions. Once this 
group is known, congruent volumes may be defined as 
portions of space that can be carried into each other 
by continuous transformations. The facts suggest, ac-
cording to Weyl, an interpretation according to which 
the group of Euclidean motions of congruent mappings 
expresses an intrinsic structure 'stamped by space on 
all its objects'. However, as Weyl points out, the 
requirement of continuity eliminates transformations of 
signature minus: " . . . a rigid body could go over 
into its mirror image only by a discontinuous jump . 
Kant finds the clue to the riddle of left and right 
in transcendental idealism: the mathematician sees 
behind it the combinatorial fact of the distinction of 
even and odd permutations.111* This presupposes an in-
dependent definition of even and odd; the 
mathematician—legitimately—redefines left and right 
as - and +; he substitutes one convention for another. 
Unless we had a prior intuitive understanding of the 
difference between mirror images--unless, that is, we 
could recognise them as different, we have no basis on 
which to label them - and +; Weyl accepts this 
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elsewhere, when he remarks that " . . . to the scien-
tific mind there is no inner difference between left 
and right. It requires an arbitrary act of choice. 1 1 1* 
Weyl asks us to consider a thought-experiment like 
Kant's: consider God's creative act; had God, rather 
than making first a left and then a right hand, begun 
by making a right one, then He would have changed the 
plan of the universe not in the first but in the second 
act, by bringing forth a hand which was equally rather 
than oppositely oriented to the first one. This seems 
to me to be part of Kant's key insight in the 1768 ar-
ticle, even if he did not fully recognise it himself." 
I mentioned above that Kant's 1768 article was 
concerned not only with offering indirect support to a 
Newtonian view of space, but also with a direct chal-
lenge to Leibniz, and in particular, the principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles. As a conclusion to 
this paper, I will take up this general point very 
briefly. 
How could Leibniz explain the existence of incon-
gruent counterparts? To some extent, the discussion 
just undertaken has suggested how a relational view of 
space assists in our understanding of the problem; but 
there is in addition a problem for Leibniz which oper-
ates on and between two levels of Leibniz's system: 
that is, phenomenal aggregates and ultimately real 
substances. The identity of indiscernibles implies 
that no two individuals can be exactly alike in'all 
their predicates, and differ solely in respect of 
spatio-temporal location. This applies to substances— 
complete individual monadic histories. The dist-
inguishability of substances is referrable, ultimately, 
to the infinite mind of God, who knows the complete 
notions of all substances. Why does this present a 
problem for Leibniz? The difficulty over incongruent 
counterparts seem irrelevant here, since it is obvious 
that we are confronted with two different objects—and 
this is the problem. The point I think is that when we 
consider the complete notions of two such objects, we 
have seen above that there is difficulty in accepting 
that there is an inner difference; they are alike in 
all essential, differentiable properties. There is no 
internal property possessed by one which is not pos-
sessed by the other. On Leibniz's principle, they 
should be the same object. He may not differentiate 
the objects by reference to relations in external 
space, because there is no such external space for the 
objects to be related to, in a way which would guaran-
tee their uniqueness." Spatial relations are 
consequences—phenomenal consequences of the percep-
tions of non-spatial monads. There is an obvious diff-
erence between two objects which are counterparts, and 
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles seems, 
superficially, untouched, since this is precisely what 
it asserts, viz., that no two objects are incapable of 
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being differentiated by means of internal properties. 
Yet the principle operates on the level of Leibnizian 
ultimate reality: the 'predicate in notion' principle 
seems to entail that there must be a predicate pos-
sessed by one of the objects which is absent from the 
complete notion of the other. Yet Kant pointed out the 
difficulty of explicating incongruent counterparts by 
means of what he would call 'merely conceptual' char-
acteristics. For God, who requires no spatial intui-
tion, there can be no difference between left and 
right, or past and future. Thus the difference is due 
either to the relations that objects have to other ob-
jects; this would commit Leibniz to the view that the 
difference is merely phenomenal—but in what could it 
be well-founded? The other possibility is for Leibniz 
to concede that the difference is due to some property 
of space—'imposing its structure on objects', as Weyl 
puts it. This suggests that space, qua determinate 
system of metric relations is Conventional', or ideal 
for Leibniz, and is 'imposed' on phenomenal aggregates. 
Leibniz would probably have been much interested in 
modern views which suggest that there may be physical 
laws which are not left-right indifferent. There are 
problems with this idea, one of which is making it in-
telligible independently of an already presupposed 
framework; in addition, we can ask for some convincing 
account of why the perceptual, macroscopic phenomenon 
of handedness, should be explicable by reference to the 
intrinsic 'handedness' of the elements of such objects. 
In the same way that it is plausible to postulate 
micro-physical discontinuity, while accepting the 
necessity of phenomenal continuity, it is also quite 
possible that left- and right-handedness—as a philo-
sophical problem, is a phenomenal puzzle, as Kant 
thought, and cannot be reduced to some putative physi-
cal differences on the microscopic or sub-microscopic 
level. For Kant, the problem of incongruent counter-
parts is that it is puzzling how two objects, with 
identical descriptions, can yet be intuited as ob-
viously different; for Leibniz, the puzzle is that two 
objects can have identical descriptions without being 
the same object. 
NOTES 
'There is a considerable range of acceptance of 
this problem in Kantian commentaries. The omission of 
the argument from the Critique of Pure Reason is cer-
tainly puzzling: Buchdahl, in Metaphysics and the 
Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 1969), thinks it was 
omitted because it offers only supporting evidence for 
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the a priori nature of space, and is, in any case, an 
analogy exemplifying what Kant thinks he has proven 
elsewhere; (cf. Buchdahl, p. 559) Broad places it more 
centrally in Kant's genera] theory of space: see C. D. 
Broad., Kant, An Introduction (Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), p. 37. My own sympathies are with Ralph 
Walker, who takes the argument to be Kant's 'real' 
reason for holding space to be an intuition; cf. 
Walker, Kant (Routledge, 1978), p. 44. 
aIn Kant: Selected Pre-critical Writings, ed. D. 
Walford and G. Kerferd (Manchester University Press, 
1968), p. 36, Körner has the rather eccentric transla-
tion of 'Gegenden' as 'directions', although this will 
turn out to be rather appropriate at some points in 
Kant's discussion: See Stephan Korner. Kant (Penguin, 
1955), p. 33. 
'On the Leibnizian view incongruent counterparts 
must be explained by means of internal or 'purely 
conceptual' characteristics. 
*Kant, op.cit., p. 42; my italics, cf. Gerhard 
Frey, Erkenntais der Wirklichkeit (Kohlhammer, 
Stuttgart, 1965), esp. p. 112-113. 
*" . . . region is related to space in general as a 
unity, of which each extension must be regarded as a 
part." Kant, op.cit., p. 37. 
'Kant concludes the 1768 article on another anti-
Leibnizian note by asserting that space is not a mere 
'Gedankending' or an ens rationis. This terminology 
reappears in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, when Kant repeats this 
point, adding the view that 'pure' space and time are 
best regarded as ens imaginarium. Critique of Pure 
Reason, tr. N. K. Smith (MacMillan, 1970), p. 295-296. 
7In the earlier paper, Kant had suggested a provo-
cative thought-experiment to illustrate his point. 
Imagine that the universe is empty except for a single 
hand. Is it a left-hand, or a right-hand? Given the 
conceptual indeterminacy of handedness, it does not 
seem to make sense to assert that it is either one or 
the other: but now imagine that a handless body is 
created. Now, it seems, the hand must fit on either 
the left or the right wrist. Yet if it does fit on the 
left wrist, then it must have been a left hand before 
the introduction of the handless body. This shows, 
Kant suggested, that some 'absolute' spatial frame-
work—a kind of 'ideal lattice' must exist independen-
tly of objects in space. Kant seems to have recognised 
the mistake in his reasoning here by the time he came 
to write the Dissertation. 
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'Leibniz had already pointed this out in the debate 
with Clarke, in his denial of the significance of the 
idea that east and west might, on a global scale, be 
reversed. Leibniz's Third Paper, in The Leibniz-Clarke 
Correspondence, ed. by H. G. Alexander (Manchester 
University Press, 1956), p. 26. Such a change would be 
quite without significance; taking a Leibnizian verifi-
cationist stand, the lone hand is not merely indetermi-
nate with respect to leftness or rightness; it is also 
neither large nor small. 
'See Kant, Prolegomena, tr. P. G. Lucas (Manchester 
University Press, 1966), §13, p. 41ff. 
"See G. Nerlich, The Shape of Space (Cambridge 
University Press, 1976). 
l ,An orientable space is one in which a global 
definition of left and right can be made; orientability 
coresponds to two-sidedness and non-orientability to 
one-sidedness; they are intrinsic topological proper-
ties independent of any external space. 
"This point relates to Kant's theory of geometry. 
According to Kant, other geometries are logically poss-
ible, but not capable of intuitive construction in our 
space. It should also be noted, with reference to the 
'rotation' of two-dimensional objects in '3 - space', 
that one cannot, in any non-metaphorical sense, 'turn 
over' a two-dimensional object, which has only one 
side. 
"The non-conservation of parity suggests a way of 
uniquely determining handedness. Since this is 
impossible in a non-orientable space, physical space 
cannot be non-orientable. It is possible to consider 
temporal equivalents of incongruent counterparts--or 
more accurately spatio-temporal equivalents, e.g., as 
space-time vectors in some theoretically possible 
space-time systems. See J. Earmen, "Kant, Incongruent 
Counterparts and the Nature of Space and Space-time," 
Ratio, v. 13, (1971). 
"H. Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural 
Science (Princeton, 1949), p. 84. 
"H. Weyl, Symmetry (Princeton, 1952), p. 17. 
"cf. Broad, op.cit., p. 42. 
""Besides the difference of time and place there 
must always be an internal principle of distinction, 
and although there are several things of the same kind, 
it is nevertheless true that none of them are ever 
perfectly alike. Thus although time and place 
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(external relation) enables us to distinguish things, 
which we do not readily distinguish by themselves, the 
things are nonetheless distinguishable in themselves. 
The exact determination of identity and diversity is 
not a matter of time and place, although it is true 
that the diversity of things is accompanied by time and 
place; because (they) bring with them different impres-
sions about the thing." Die philosophischen Schriften 
von G. E. Leibniz, herausgegeben von C. J. Gerhardt, 
Berlin, 1875-90, v. 213. 
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